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Contested governance of drinking water provisioning 






Governance and management of ecosystem services involve a diversity of institutional 
mechanisms and policy processes from voluntary to regulatory and collaborative approaches. The 
governance structures and policy processes are often contested, particularly when stakeholder 
concerns are insufficiently addressed, particularly of those who are most affected by policy 
decisions. This research examines how collaborative governance enables the ecosystem services 
approach to source water protection, thereby addressing contested governance problems and policy 
processes in transboundary river basins in central Nepal. The data were collected using key 
informant interviews, policy workshops, policy document review, and direct observation. 
Research results suggest that the state established collaborative governance institutions to improve 
already adversarial situations rather than in the co-management of water provisioning and other 
ecosystem services. We conclude that collaborative governance should focus on empowering 
vulnerable communities to speak for themselves and for the natural environment, particularly to 
maintain the sustainable flow of multiple ecosystem services for current and future generations.  
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Besides water-induced casualties, nearly 2.1 billion people worldwide lack access to safe drinking 
water, 4.5 billion lack adequate sanitation, and 2.2 million people die from water-related diseases 
every year (WHO, 2017). Contrary to this grim statistics, it was proclaimed that Target C of the 
seventh Millennium Development Goal (MDG7), which aimed to halve the proportion of people 
without access to improved sources of water, was met five years ahead of schedule in 2010 (MDG, 
2013). Globally, while rural areas struggle to secure clean drinking water, sanitation and other 
livelihood needs, rapidly growing urban municipalities face challenges with an adequate supply of 
safe water and appropriate infrastructure (Brooks, 2002). In order to address growing water crises, 
urban areas draw additional water from the surrounding rural areas to compensate for the loss of 
urban ecosystem services. Although rural to urban water transfers are often seen as just and 
legitimate state interventions, restrictions on customary use and reduced flows in the river can 
cause injustices to rural communities and the environment. The benefits of water extraction are, 
for the most part, accrued in urban places where the raw water is processed in treatment plants to 
generate added value in the form of clean and safe water to support the ‘flush and forget’ consumer 
culture. Contrary to this anthropocentric view on the use of water resources, water is an important 
service the natural ecosystem provides, among others. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA) identifies that water is an ecosystem service (with provisioning, regulating, 
cultural and supporting functions), and the need for responsible management of the finite supply 
of drinking water sources (MDG, 2013; MEA, 2005). As a follow up to the water related MDGs 
targets, the sixth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 6) aims to ensure access to water and 
sanitation for all by 2030 (United Nations, 2015). 
Stewardship of the environment and ecosystem services is normally left to the voluntary sector 
(Liarakou et al., 2011; Ryan et al., 2001), but it is often the case that regulations are also necessary, 
particularly when over extraction is imminent (EPA, 2009; Morrison et al., 2014). Besides self-
motivated volunteers, environmental stewards also include state regulators, such as park wardens 
and law enforcement officials, and collaborative governance measures, such as forest stewardship, 
marine stewardship and fair trade certification (Kreutzwiser et al., 2011; Richter, 2008). 
Furthermore, as neither regulative nor voluntary governance is sufficiently effective in managing 
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ecosystem services, scholars suggest to opt in for the collaboration of state and non-state actors 
(Ananda et al., 2013; Ansell et al., 2008). Governance and management of ecosystem services 
entail a diversity of policy instruments, such as assessment and valuation of ecosystem services, 
but they are often controversial because different stakeholders could prioritize provisioning 
services (e.g., drinking water and food) and other serveries differently (Keune et al., 2015; 
Schleyer et al., 2015). Municipal water provisioning is often understood as a problem of physical 
water scarcity, which is rather a manifestation of inefficient management of ecosystem services 
(Sharp et al., 2011). Particularly in large-scale water diversion, it is a challenge to maintain 
environmental flow, which is the water regime provided within a river, wetland or coastal zone to 
sustain ecosystem health (Acreman, 2016; Dyson et al., 2003). Despite this fact, institutional 
aspects are insufficiently addressed in the development of water resources and infrastructures 
(Keune et al., 2015; Mann et al., 2015; Primmer et al., 2015). This research aims to addresses this 
gap by examining how collaborative governance and management enable the ecosystem services 
approach to source water protection in Nepal’s transboundary river basins that provide drinking 
water for the Kathmandu Valley, the national capital and the largest city of 2.5 million human 
population. This research creates new knowledge in the science and practice of ecosystem services, 
which would lead to better policy decisions to empower vulnerable communities most affected by 
natural resource development in Nepal and similar contexts across the developing countries. 
However, the findings should be interpreted within the context that the entry points for this 
research were two most significant, and yet highly controversial, rural to urban water transfer 
projects in the country with time frames spanning over eight decades and limited availability of 
longitudinal data.  
The next section first reviews the literature on governance and management of ecosystem services 
and develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of empirical data. Then we describe study 
areas, including the two most significant rural to urban water supply transfers – the largest existing 
source in Sundarijal and the largest ongoing project in Melamchi.  This section ends with a 
description of the procedure to collect empirical data on drinking water provisioning services. 
Then, in Section 3, we present research results and analyze the findings on the governance and 
management of ecosystem services in transboundary river basins in Nepal. Section 4 discusses 
research findings using the conceptual framework in Section 2, and the final section concludes the 
4 
 
paper with an emphasis on the collaborative empowerment of local communities to govern 
ecosystem services.  
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Governance and management of natural resources and ecosystem 
services 
Different modes of natural resource governance address uncertainty and complexity differently, 
which often results in questionable or controversial policy decisions. This body of literature 
represents a continuum of regulatory and voluntary approaches with various forms of collaborative 
approaches in between (Table 1). 
Table 1.  Theories of policy change. 
 Management approach 




Low  Rational choice 
(Homans, 1961) 
Institutional rational 
choice(Kiser et al., 1982) 
Adaptive management 
(Folke et al., 2005) 
High The precautionary 
principle (Cameron 
et al., 1991) 
Advocacy 
coalition(Sabatier et al., 
2007) 
Multiple governance (Hill 
et al., 2006) 
Adaptive co-
management (Schultz et 
al., 2011) 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
2.1.1. Regulatory governance 
Some form of state control, through market mechanisms or centralized economic planning, is 
common in many jurisdictions through measures, such as nationalization of forest areas, 
declaration of conservation areas, and government managed large-scale water transfer projects 
(Agrawal et al., 2007). People make rational decisions based on presumably complete information, 
such as costs and benefits of action (Homans, 1961). They, however, fail to recognize traditional 
or habitual action, emotional or effectual decisions, and various forms of the value-oriented acts 
because decisions are often made under incomplete information, including the limitations of 
human cognition, habitual actions, and deep cultural patterns (Goode, 1997; Scott, 2000). In other 
words, regulatory public policy-making fails to explain the origins of social norms and values, 
especially those of altruism, reciprocity and trust, to the problem of social norms (Funtowictz et 
al., 1993). This is why the rational choice theory suffers from its failure to explain why individuals 
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join many kinds of groups, associations and networks to make a collective choice, the problem of 
collective action (Ostrom, 1998).  
Under incomplete scientific evidence, the precautionary principle guides a decision, particularly 
when there are severe threats of irreversible or irreparable damage to human wellbeing and 
ecosystem services (Cameron et al., 1991; Summers  et al., 2008). The threats of irreversible 
damage are used to justify additional precautions in the management of ecosystem services 
(Persson, 2016). However, decisions are only provisional because the precautionary principle is 
the least understood and often controversial decision tool (Foster et al., 2000). According to this 
principle, it would be a breach of the regulation when we fail to act on the grounds of scientific 
uncertainty alone (Faunce et al., 2008; Hornbaker et al., 2003; Marambio-Jones et al., 2010; 
Stewart, 2002).  
2.1.2. Voluntary governance 
Voluntary governance is a relatively recent initiative in the formal policy process although 
voluntarism has been known throughout human history. Voluntary actions are motivated by non-
material incentives, such as learning and contact with nature (Liarakou et al., 2011); a sense of 
belonging, caretaking the environment and personal learning (Bramston et al., 2011); and ego, 
altruism and concern for the biosphere (Schultz, 2001). Voluntary governance focuses on local 
adaptation to changes in social and ecological systems through self-organizing systems of 
governance (Asah et al., 2012). Adaptive management is one such science and practice of 
ecosystem services, which challenges the command and control approach of regulative governance 
(Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Holling, 1978; Ryan et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2002). Adaptive 
management aims to enhance socio-ecological resilience, which reflects two different worldviews: 
engineering resilience and ecological resilience (Folke, 2006; Holling, 1996). While the former 
entails resilience as the ability of the system to return to the steady-state after a perturbation 
(Holling, 1978), the latter refers to the ability of a natural ecosystem to absorb disturbance before 
the system redefines its structure (Folke, 2006; Gallopin, 2006; Gunderson et al., 1995).  
Particularly to address the complexity and uncertainty of natural resource management, the 
literature on adaptive co-management recognizes the importance of engaging vulnerable 
communities most affected by resource development, often in collaboration with the state agencies 
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(Olsson et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2011). However, adaptive co-management also faces 
challenges, such as effectively engaging multiple stakeholders, building trust, making systematic 
connections, motivating stewardship behaviours, and facilitating learning, innovation, and 
adaptation (Bramston et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2013; Kreutzwiser et al., 2011).  
2.1.3. Collaborative governance 
Questionable performance of regulatory governance often results in the reduction of state control 
opening up the opportunity for the participation of natural resource dependent communities in 
policy processes (Babel et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2011). In recognition of this opportunity to 
engage affected communities, collaborative governance and management gained currency 
(Emerson et al., 2011; Ferreyra et al., 2008; Parkes et al., 2008). A comprehensive definition of 
collaborative governance includes the following five aspects (Gray et al., 2018). First, the actors 
are interdependent concerning a problem or an issue of natural resource management, and none of 
them can solve the problem on their own. Second, collaboration is an emergent process that uses 
shared rules, norms and structures. Third, it involves constructively wrestling with a difference 
using formal and informal negotiations and consensus-building to find trade-offs that create value 
for all stakeholders. Fourth, stakeholders bring different competencies and need to respect and 
learn from each other's expertise. Finally, stakeholders assume joint risk and responsibility for the 
outcome of their joint efforts. Himmelman (2001) differentiates the aim of collaboration into 
collaborative betterment and collaborative empowerment, and the latter is more about the building 
capacity of vulnerable communities affected by resource development to produce intended results.  
2.2 Conceptual framework for empirical data analysis 
In this section, we discuss five challenges of the collaborative governance of environment and 
ecosystem services, which will guide the analysis of research results (Table 2). The challenges are 
failure to acknowledge complexity, hierarchical social space, the interdependence of management 
problems in space, time and scale, lack of trust and commitment among stakeholders, and conflict 







Table 2. Management challenges and related propositions for collaborative governance. 
Challenges Propositions for collaborative governance* Empirical examples** 
Complexity and 
uncertainty 
Collaborative governance enhances the economy 
of scale when independent actors are less likely to 
deliver ecosystem products or services. 
Collaborative governance reduces transaction costs 
as it minimizes points of contact with affected 
communities. 
Focus on infrastructure development 
and technology transfer. 
Community engagement through 
social upliftment programmes only at 
later stages of the project. 
Hierarchical social 
space 
Collaborative governance helps federal or state-
level agencies to design better policies or programs 
with local or regional governments that require 
localized actions. 
Collaboration with federal or state agencies builds 
local or regional capacity or provides access to 
resources. 
Centralized, predictive planning and 
implementation of rural to urban 
water transfer projects. 





Collaborative governance is effective to solve 
interdependent natural resource management 
problems when stakeholders do not already 
participate in other collaborative venues and/or 
they have a weak social capital. 
Collaboration with organizations active in other 
sectors is preferred when natural resource 
managers are constrained to act within one policy 
sector, but they face a problem that spans multiple 
sectors (e.g., food, water, sanitation). 
Governance of multiple ecosystem 
services in transboundary river 
basins. 
Include multiple policy sub-sectors: 
water, sanitation, hygiene, food, 
agriculture, natural resources, urban 
farming, food forests, urban forests, 
and conservation of the holy rivers 
and the UNESCO World Heritage 




Collaboration with parties directly affected by 
proposed actions is likely to be effective when 
natural resource managers perceive that the 
legitimacy of their organization is low. 
Collaboration with well-reputed actors is likely to 
happen when natural resource managers perceive a 
low legitimacy of their organization. 
The state collaborated with affected 
communities, action groups and non-
governmental organizations to 
transform adversarial relationships. 
The Melamchi Water Supply project 
sought an opportunity to collaborate 
with non-governmental organizations 




Collaborative governance is likely to be more 
effective when the perceived costs of controversy, 
contentions and litigations are higher than the costs 
involved in a collaboration.  
Natural resource managers are more likely to 
collaborate when they are worried about the loss of 
power and influence rather than joint gains. 
Civil society organizations and local 
communities were initially seen as 
contingent to the success of the 
project 
A transformation from contingent to 
necessary collaboration for effective 
management of ecosystem services 
Note: 
*Propositions adapted from Scott et al. (2017).  
**The empirical examples are elaborated in the Results section and subsequently discussed in the 
Discussion section. 
 
First, regulatory governance often does not properly recognize the complexity resulting in 
unintended, and sometimes perverse, consequences of large-scale planning and centralized, 
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hierarchical command and control management (Booher, 2005; Booher et al., 2010; Innes et al., 
2018). The unintended impacts of well-meaning centralized planning include the simplification of 
complex issues as if the cause and effect relationships are evident, which subsequently results in 
poor policy outcomes (Scott et al., 2017). Complex systems are characterized by a high level of 
uncertainty and a low level of agreement among stakeholders (Stacey, 2002). Collaborative 
governance aims to diversify issues, improve the quality of policy outcomes, reduces the point of 
contact for service providers to reduce per unit cost of services (Scott et al., 2017). A low level of 
stakeholder agreement in complex systems provides a space for argumentation and debate (Hinsch, 
2010). However, if stakeholders fail to use this as an argumentative space safe enough for their 
value proposition, collaborative governance will simply perpetuate the liberal principle of justice 
as a moral virtue of political systems. What is important is to complement the moral virtue of 
political systems with the political virtue of legitimacy, questioning the very purpose of non-
argumentative and hierarchical stakeholder participation (Sleat, 2015).   
Second, each level of government has its areas of authority and responsibility, both geographically 
and substantively (Booher, 2005). Geographically, the local fits within the regional, regional, 
within state, and state within national. These areas of authority are often carried out through 
hierarchical, command-and-control governance thereby limiting the opportunity to augment the 
quality of traditional non-argumentative decision making. As an alternative, collaborative 
governance aims to bridge hierarchies of local, regional, state and federal agencies (Margerum, 
2011; Scott et al., 2017). 
Third, decision making in complex and diverse natural resource management problems are 
interdependent. When traditional natural resource management agencies alone cannot solve 
complex and interdependent problems, collaborative decision making would more effectively 
facilitate work across places, spaces, scales, and policy sectors (Booher, 2005). Particularly when 
a need is required to collaborate with public interest groups, natural resource managers should 
distinguish collaborative governance from more casual and conventional forms of non-
argumentative interaction (Ansell et al., 2008; Freeman, 2010).  If collaborative governance is 
described as informal relationships that agencies and interest groups cultivate, it would merely 
perpetuate the liberal principle of justice as the virtue of political systems (Sleat, 2015). Ansell and 
Gash (2008) further suggest that collaborative governance as, for some natural resource managers, 
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can imply public-private partnership, which typically requires collaboration to function, but their 
goal is often to achieve coordination.  
Fourth, addressing complex natural resource management problems involves a great deal of time, 
trust and commitment among stakeholders to avoid a power struggle, miscommunication and 
conflict (Himmelman, 2001). For traditional top-down regulatory governance, trust and 
confidence on the part of the public originate from deep core beliefs at the constitutional level and 
policy core belief at the directional level (Beetham, 1991; Booher, 2005). Trust cannot be assumed 
in collaborative governance that requires managers to collaborate across institutional boundaries.  
The fifth and final challenge is that collaborative governance can become culturally diverse and 
would require to include traditionally excluded stakeholders. The problem of mistrust, conflict and 
miscommunication could be intimidating as natural resource managers are increasingly required 
to deal with an array of the public with their languages, values, perspectives, cognitive styles, and 
worldviews (Booher, 2005). Thus, deliberation, or reasoned communication, is recognized as a 
hallmark and essential ingredient of transforming conflict into creativity (Emerson et al., 2011). In 
collaborative governance, stakeholders would often have an adversarial relationship to one 
another, but the goal is to transform adversarial relationships into more cooperative or empowering 
ones (Ansell et al., 2008; Himmelman, 2001). The five theoretical propositions discussed above 
inform about when and why collaborative governance is useful to govern and manage ecosystem 
services (Emerson et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2017). 
2.3 Study Areas 
This study was conducted in the context of Nepal’s two most significant rural to urban water 
transfers for municipal use in the Kathmandu Valley: the existing intrabasin water source in 
Sundarijal and the ongoing interbasin water transfer project in Melamchi.  
2.3.1. Sundarijal Water Supply System 
The Sundarijal water source lies in the Gokarneswor Municipality within the Bagmati River Basin. 
The source of the Sundarijal Water Supply System originates from the Shivapuri Nagarjun 
National Park and provides about 30 mld water to the Kathmandu Valley’s municipal water supply. 
If source water protection practices are effectively implemented by providing incentives to local 
communities, it has the potential of generating additional 75 mld water (Maskey, 2008). As a 
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regulatory measure to conserve the source water, a protected watershed area declared in 1976, later 
upgraded into a wildlife reserve in 1985 and finally as a highland national park in 2002. The 
upstream villages in this area predominantly inhabited by Indigenous Tamang communities occur 
within the national park and the buffer zone, which serves as a strategic zone requiring protection 
to supply drinking water to the national capital of Nepal. Total protection has provided through 
formulated programme activities of massive plantation and reforestation to minimize further 
degradation of the fragile hill slopes which had been deforested, cultivated and grazed (Babel et 
al., 2011; Shrestha, 1998). According to the recent annual report of the Shivapuri Nagarjun 
National Park (2017), there were 1700 Nepalese Army officers and 51 civilian staff responsible 
for the management of ecosystem services in the park. 
2.3.2 Melamchi Water Supply Project 
The Government of Nepal has proposed a large-scale drinking water supply transfer project called 
the Melamchi Water Supply Project to resolve water crises in the Kathmandu Valley (Figure 2).   
This project is designed to meet the long-term (over 30-40 years) water demand in the Kathmandu 
Valley (located in the Bagmati River basin) by diverting water from the Melamchi River located 
in Indrawati River basin (part of the Koshi River Basin) 40 km northeast of Kathmandu (Pant et 
al., 2008). The Melamchi Water Supply Project diverts water from an arguably water-abundant 
rural setting to a water-scarce urban area in the Kathmandu Valley through the construction of a 
27 km tunnel across the fragile mountain range (Domènech et al., 2013; Pant et al., 2008). The 
Melamchi water source lies in the Langtang National Park, which was also established in 1976 
(Borradaile et al., 1977). Several villages, mostly the Hyolmo communities, are located within the 
park and the buffer zone. They depend on natural resources for much of their livelihoods, such as 
grazing livestock within designated areas, collecting grass, fodder, fuelwood and construction 
timber at low cost (Fox et al., 1996). 
All major rivers and tributaries in the Bagmati River Basin, where the Kathmandu Valley lies, are 
fed by monsoon rains. In contrast, the Melamchi River in the Indrawati River Basin is fed by rain, 
snow, and glacier melt. High seasonal variability in rainfall is also a part of the problem in Nepal's 
drinking water supply as about 80 percent of monsoon rain falls from June to August. Climate 
change can further disrupt ecosystem services in these basins. A recent assessment warns that if 
global warming continues, at least one-third of Himalayan glaciers could melt by the end of this 
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century disrupting the flow of water and other ecosystem services for over two billion people in 
Asia (Wester et al., 2019). The Himalayan National Park Regulations, 1976  granted local residents 
within the national park and the buffer zone limited use of park resources (Bhattarai et al., 2017). 
Scholars and practitioners have recommended the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) 
provided by local residents, which is a market-led mechanism to motivate source water protection 
by those residing within the park and in the buffer zone (Kunwar, 2008; Maskey, 2008; Pant et al., 
2013). In 1993, the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act amended for the fourth time to 
include the provision of buffer zone management, which provides a legal provision to allocate 30 
to 50 percent of park revenue for community development programmes (Bhattarai et al., 2017; Peh 
et al., 2016). However, a policy maker familiar with the Shivapuri Nagarjun National Park told 
that revenue from the park is not even enough for the regular park maintenance, let alone payment 




Figure 1. Study area showing existing and ongoing municipal water transfer systems for the 
Kathmandu Valley.  
Note: 
The Melamchi Water Supply Tunnel (27 km) is proposed to transfer water from the Melamchi 
River in the Indrawati River Basin to the Kathmandu Valley (Bhaktapur, Kathmandu, and 
Lalitpur districts) in the Bagmati River Basin. In the second and third phases of the project, this 
tunnel will transfer water from two additional rivers in the Indrawati River Basin. 
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2.4 Data collection procedure 
This research employs a case study approach to examine current and future source water protection 
measures to supply safe and adequate drinking water while promoting already vulnerable rural 
livelihoods. The empirical data were collected from November 2015 to February 2016, followed 
by a short follow-up field visit from December 2016 to January 2017. This was the time when 
Nepal went through multiple vulnerabilities – the immediate aftermath of the 2015 Gorkha 
Earthquake, broader blockade with India, and transition to the federal restructuring of governance 
structures and policy processes. This paper is part of a larger mixed methods case study and 
primarily based on the review of 34 policy document reviews, 40 key informant interviews, two 
policy workshops, and direct observation on various occasions. The intention was to interrogate 
different perspectives on the central phenomenon or key concept of water provisioning services 
(Creswell et al., 2018).  
The sampling of policy documents was purposive and remained iterative throughout the research 
process. In most cases, key informants spontaneously suggested relevant documents to refer to, for 
additional information on some specific topics. Some respondents generously provided hard copies 
or a link to electronic copies of policy documents that they thought would be relevant. Altogether, 
the policy documents identified include 18 acts and regulations, and 16 documents on strategies, 
plans and policy. Although most of them were available in an electronic format, a few documents 
were available only in hard copies. Some of them were only available in the Nepali language. The 
coding of these documents was done manually by the first author, who speak the local language 
Nepali so that we were able to include the hard copies in the analysis and the Nepali language 
documents without translation. Policy workshops were held on two different occasions. The first 
policy workshop was held at the inception of the fieldwork to identify relevant policy issues and 
to solicit suggestions for the effective implementation of field research. The second policy 
workshop involved a discussion on preliminary research results.    
 
A total of 40 key informant interviews were conducted, which took 1 to 2.5 hours each. The 
identification of key informants began with the prominent people, which led to sampling widely 
across Nepal’s Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector to the degree that we were confident 
that we had spoken to the majority of the decision makers. We used a purposive snowball sample 
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stratified by seven stakeholder groups – local communities, civil society actors, public policy 
makers, research scientists, service providers, donors, and contractor (Figure 2). Initial contacts 
were identified from the project documents and in consultation with the local host organizations. 
The persons recommended by initial contacts were interviewed, and they were asked for additional 
key informants. This process continued until all stakeholder groups were represented, and 
saturation was reached with no new information being generated. The interviews were audio-
recorded with the permission of the interviewees, and transcribed into Nepali, and translated into 
English for analysis. Then, the interview transcripts were imported into the qualitative data 
analysis software NVivo. v. 11. A decision was made to merge the civil societies and local 
communities into one category of stakeholders as they had a common interest to serve affected 
communities and donors and contractors also kept in one category. The number of respondents 
from the five stakeholder groups was 15, 10, 8, 4, and 3, respectively civil society actors, public 
policy makers, researchers, service providers, and donors. A coding framework was developed for 
data analysis, which included a priori axial codes from the literature as well as open codes 





Figure 2. Stakeholder organization of the municipal water supply systems  
Note: The number of key informants from respective organizations is indicated in the parentheses 
together with their organizational affiliation. The horizontal line separates dominant and minority 
stakeholders. 
 
The most significant sites of observation are the two rural water sources and water treatment plants. 
The first author visited the source of the Sundarijal Water Supply System, which is 12 km east of 
the downtown of Kathmandu. She also visited the Shivapuri Nagarjun National Park, where the 
water source lies. The upstream communities, who are mostly Indigenous, follow subsistence 
farming, run small businesses, and have only basic water and sanitation facilities. The researcher 
also visited the Melamchi Valley in the Indrawati River Basin on five occasions and observed the 
water diversion site in the Melamchi River at Ambathan and the access to water and sanitation 
facilities in the local communities. These visits were held from November to February when 
mountains were supposed to be covered by snow. According to local elders, it was unusual to see 
16 
 
bare mountains during this time of the year and they believed that it was because of climate change. 
Another observation of interest was the existing and new water treatment plants in Sundarijal in 
the Bagmati River Basin. The existing treatment plant was constructed in the mid-twentieth 
century and a new treatment plant of 85 mld capacity to treat the water from the Melamchi Water 
Supply Project. The direct observation method was also used to listen and collect the perspectives 
of the broader citizenry, such as taxi drivers, farmers, small business holders and scientists in both 
the source and receiving basins because the controversy about water provisioning services has 
become a long standing interest for the public. 
3. Results 
3.1 Dwindling ecosystem services 
Key informants shared the belief that the Kathmandu Valley thrived on traditional systems of water 
management until the arrival of modernity, together with rapid population growth and 
urbanization. An interview with a water scientist revealed that the water and sanitation services of 
the valley used to be supported by royal canals (rajkulos) and stone spouts (dhunge dharas). Royal 
canals that used to transfer water from various sources from the outskirts of the valley to the urban 
core regularly recharged the stone spouts while also irrigating crops. In recent decades, the 
Kathmandu Valley has faced water scarcity. Municipal water supplies are available few hours only 
on a few days of a week. Those who can afford pump water from the municipal supply lines or 
private wells, turn to private water tankers, and buy bottled water to meet their ongoing water 
needs. Key informant interviews and direct observation revealed that many households in the 
valley build an underground water storage tank and fill it either from tanker water or whenever 
municipal is supplied. Urban poor, who cannot afford to build private infrastructures, such as wells 
and underground tanks, will not have water if they miss the moment the water is available from 
the municipal taps forcing them to go to polluted creeks and rivers to fetch water.  
 
In Sundarijal, there was a provision of leaving more than 20 percent flows in the river than the 
amount of customary use as required by the Drinking Water and Sanitation Regulation (2016) to 
avoid adverse environmental impacts. However, enforcement of this regulation was challenging 
particularly in the face of the dwindling quantity of water at the source and increasing demand in 
the Kathmandu Valley. Seasonal variation should have to be considered because the Sundarijal 
17 
 
water source is fed by monsoon rain. An analysis of the trend from 1980 to 2009 shows that the 
pre-monsoon rain increased, but the post-monsoon rain increased with subsequent impacts on river 
discharge (Dhital et al., 2013). An estimate shows that average discharge at the Sundarijal 
diversion site is 164 mld and 30 percent of which is diverted by the Kathmandu Upatyaka 
Khanepani Limited (KUKL) to feed into the municipal water supply system of the Kathmandu 
Valley (KUKL, 2016; SNNP, nd). The remaining water is either diverted locally by various water 
users’ groups and individual households or left in the river to maintain environmental flow for 
flora and fauna, including wild mammals in the Shivapuri Nagarjun National Park. Reliable 
estimates of neither customary use nor environmental flow estimates are available for the 
tributaries of the Bagmati River. A key informant summarizes the situation as follows based on 
his knowledge of the prevailing regulation that requires to leave at least 20 percent additional water 
than what has been customarily used:  
In Sundarijal, we left more than 20 percent flows in the river [ in the beginning]. Nevertheless, we 
keep diverting the same amount of water over the last 50 years despite the decrease in water flow in 
the river. As a result, the environmental flow in the Bagmati River has been significantly decreased. 
(Respondent 26, policy maker)  
The government of Nepal turned its attention to inter-basin water transfer attributing the 'system 
failure' to the unprecedented population growth and unplanned urbanization in the city, resulting 
significantly from the internal displacement of rural residents during the decade-long Maoist 
insurgency (1996-2006). Contrary to this dominant belief, interviews with key informants revealed 
that rather than effectively managing ecosystem services in the recipient basin, the state 
legitimatized their decision to invest in large-scale inter-basin projects, which has drained aid 
money disproportionately affect lives and livelihoods of more vulnerable communities in the 
country (Table 3). The deteriorating urban ecosystem services put undue pressure on rural 
ecosystems as we have seen from the rural to the urban transfer of resources, such as water, food, 
herbs, and timber. The increasing loss of urban ecosystem services in the Kathmandu Valley are 
compensated by the transfer of services from nearby rural ecosystems. Regulating services include 
filtration of pollutants, assimilation of solid wastes, purification of wastewater, insect pollination 
of crops and carbon sequestration in biomass and soil. Excessive human pressure on natural water 
bodies in the Kathmandu Valley deteriorated the urban ecosystem services turning the holy rivers, 
Bagmati and Bishnumati and their tributaries, into open sewers. Key informants described that 
modernization of urban landscapes for economic benefits also destroyed cultural services, such as 
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the values of the holy rivers, the Pashupatinath Temple, Swayambhuna Temple and other 
UNESCO World Heritage Sites.  
 
The loss of the urban ecosystem services impacted not only the provisioning, regulation and 
cultural services but also supporting services, such as the reduction in organic biomass production, 
disruption of biogeochemical cycles, disruption of the natural flow of floodwater,  soil erosion, 
biodiversity loss and ecological vulnerability. As iterated by one of the policy workshop 
participants, livelihood related activities of the upstream rural communities can also pollute source 
water, which remained as a silent agenda for dominant stakeholders. Local and Indigenous Hyolmo 
communities were worried that the project could not only limit the supply of water for them, but 
it can also put restrictions on their livelihood activities as measures of source water protection. The 
Indigenous Tamang communities in Sundarijal have already experienced this aspect of 
vulnerability. Concerns were also expressed that the Melamchi Water Supply Project would 
aggravate the drying up of spring water sources, and also create mental health problems from the 
fear of relocation from ancestral land and the loss of opportunity to worship their rivers and 
cremate dead bodies on riverbanks.  
 
Table 3. Deteriorating ecosystem services in the Kathmandu Valley puts pressure on rural areas 
Ecosystem 
services 
Sundarijal Melamchi Kathmandu Valley 
Provisioning Source water (+) 
Food production (+) 
Firewood, fodder timber, 
herbs (+/-) 
Source water (+) 
Food production (+) 
Firewood, fodder, timber, 
herbs (+/-) 
Water quality (-) 
Source water (-) 





Filtration of pollutants (+) 




Filtration of pollutants (+) 
Water purification, waste 
assimilation (+) 
Loss of urban forest, pollinators (-) 
Encroachment of wetland, flood (-) 
Rivers/creeks turned sewers (-) 
Cultural Spiritual/aesthetic (+) 
Tourism/sense of place (+) 
Spiritual/aesthetic (+) 
Tourism/sense of place (+) 
Spiritual/aesthetic (+/-) 
Tourism/sense of place (+/-) 
Supporting 
 
Soil erosion (-) 
Biodiversity (+) 
Soil erosion (-) 
Biodiversity (+) 
Nutrition pollution (-) 
Biodiversity loss (- 
Note: (-) Deteriorating ecosystem services, (+) Functioning ecosystem services, (+/-) Ecosystem services either at risk 
or face stringent regulation. The four categories of ecosystem services are adopted from the MEA (2005) 
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3.2 Deteriorating water provisioning services 
Direct observation showed that one of the sources of pollution in the Bagmati River and its 
tributaries is the direct discharge of solid waste and liquid wastewater into the river beyond the 
capacity of waste assimilation. Among the five major wastewater treatment plants that were 
constructed during the last four decades, only one was working, albeit partially, at the time of 
fieldwork. An emerging issue is that wastewater from industries, public and private hospitals and 
households are usually discharged into the already polluted water bodies without proper treatment. 
Only in 2009, the High Powered Committee for Integrated Development of the Bagmati 
Civilization (HPCIDBC) was established as a river basin agency to implement source water 
protection programs in the Bagmati River Basin. The primary goal of this committee is to conserve 
tributaries of the Bagmati River.  
 
A respondent from the river basin agency stated that they aim to facilitate various watershed 
management activities. Although these activities were coordinated by this agency, the 
implementation was primarily a top-down decision to construct a trunk sewer pipeline along both 
banks of the river, development of a secondary sewer pipeline, rehabilitation of wastewater 
treatment plants, river training works, greenbelts along the bank of the river, and public awareness 
programs. For example, the communities upstream of Gokarna will receive a rainwater harvesting 
system to enhance the water level in the Bagmati River during the dry season. In an interview, a 
policy maker mentioned that the Bagmati River Basin Improvement Project was in the process of 
constructing two dams on the Bagmati River to regulate flow. They are a 19 m high Dhap Dam in 
Nagmati headwaters and 60 to 70 m high Nagmati Dam close to Chisapani, in the Shivapuri 
Nagarjun National Park. These dams will respectively store 800 thousand cubic metres of water, 
sufficient to provide a dry season environmental flow of 40 litres per second, and 8 million cubic 
metres of water, sufficient to provide a dry season environmental flow of 400 litres per second 
(ADB, 2013). As of September 5, 2019, a bidding process has been initiated to find contractors for 
an estimated cost of UD$ 1.3 m (GoN, 2019).  
 
A review of project documents and key informant interviews indicate that a local advocacy 
organization, the Melamchi Concern Group, was concerned about water reallocation, which could 
have long-term impacts on the deterioration of ecosystem services in the Melamchi Valley. As 
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indicated in the Environmental Management Plan, the Melamchi Water Supply Project will 
maintain 0.4 cubic metres of water per second in the Melamchi River, which is less than 20 percent 
of the estimated average flow of 2.37 cubic metres of water per second in the river (Khadka et al., 
2008). The legitimacy of this provision is questionable because the Drinking Water and Sanitation 
Regulation (2016) requires water transfer projects, small or large, to leave 20 percent additional 
water on the amount of customary use or a minimum amount to avoid adverse environmental 
impacts. Stakeholders of the Melamchi Water Supply Project demanded a levy from KUKL, the 
only formal water and sanitation service provider in the Kathmandu Valley. Although a resident 
recalled talk about sharing 1 to 2 percent of revenue from the sale of water in the Kathmandu 
Valley, he was worried that there had been no formal legislation about this provision until the time 
of this interview. Another resident summarized the legal challenges of revenue sharing as follows:  
I understand that to determine levy, there should be a talk at the policy level. They need regulations 
to determine levy in this type of drinking water project. Then they should approve the regulation from 
the parliament. We understand that this could take a longer time to complete the policy-making 
process. However, this process has not been initiated. I am afraid that by the time they initiate this 
process, the project may already be completed. Community dialogues are there about the levy, but 
they don't have a basis to come to a figure. (Respondent 10, civil society) 
 
3.3 Increasing demand for water provisioning services 
Over the last century, the population in the Kathmandu Valley increased from under a half-million 
to 2.5 million in 2011, according to the latest available population census. Unofficial estimates are 
as high as four million, which far exceed the figure from the latest census because the national 
capital has become a transit hub for people who work across the country and also travel abroad for 
migrant work. In recent decades, the population increase in the Kathmandu Valley combined with 
unplanned and inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure development have made once viable, 
relatively smaller, intra-basin water transfer systems seemingly inadequate to support the 
increasing water demands. The earthquake in the spring of 2015 further aggravated the situation 
of the already poor water and sanitation infrastructure in the capital city. The current water demand 
in the Kathmandu Valley is about 366 mld (million litres per day) and the combined supply of 
groundwater and surface water (in the dry season) varies between 65 and 85 mld and in the wet 
season between140 to 144 mld (Bhattarai et al., 2005; KUKL, 2016). Thus, the available supply 








Figure 3. Projected water demand in the Kathmandu Valley. Source: Authors’ estimates with 
reference to CBS (2014). Note: Figure 3 (a) water demand based on 50 litres per capita per day 
(United Nations standards for domestic use), and Figure 3 (b) water demand based on 135 litres 
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Using an exponential smoothing function (ETS) to project population growth shows that by 2050 
the population of Kathmandu Valley will be estimated at 2.8 million. By the end of this century, 
the population will be 3.7 million. According to the United Nations, for basic household use, the 
per capita water requirement is 50 litres per day, and the government of Nepal estimates that for 
domestic as well as industrial use, the per capita water requirement is 135 litres per day. Using 
these two standards, by the end of the century, the estimated water demands for the Kathmandu 
Valley are 185 mld (Figure 3a) and 499 mld (Figure 3b). These estimates have used population 
data since 1911. Similarly, medium-term estimates for these two standards are respectively 140 
mld and 378 mld. However, a short-term forecast to 2021 using population data since 2001 shows 
a much higher water demand: 481 mld and 541 mld, respectively, for 50 litres and 135 litres per 
capita per day requirements (Udmale et al., 2016). 
4. Discussion 
This section discusses the research results using the five challenges of natural resource 
management identified in the conceptual framework (Table 2), specifically about how 
collaborative governance could enhance water provisioning services in the transboundary river 
basins.  
4.1 Complexity and uncertainty of ecosystem services management problems 
In order to solve complex management problems, centralized predictive planning should be 
complemented by alternative planning approaches, such as visioning, adaptive co-management, 
and transformational collaboration (Linnenluecke et al., 2017). Transforming power structures in 
the governance and management of ecosystem services is challenging because there could be a 
diversity of power centres, resulting in a governance problem of polycentricity (Ostrom, 2010). 
The unintended impacts of well-meaning centralized planning include the simplification of 
complex issues as if the cause and effect relationships are clear, resulting in a poor quality of policy 
outcomes (Scott et al., 2017). Complex systems are characterized by high levels of uncertainty and 
low levels of stakeholder agreement on controversial issues (Stacey, 2002). The specific situations 
in the two water supply transfer projects of this study can be classified into four categories along 
two dimensions: certainty and agreement (Table 3). First, potential relocation of upstream Hyolmo 
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communities, which has already been resisted. This issue is far from an agreement among relevant 
stakeholders, and the ultimate policy decision is still uncertain. 
Table 3. Management decisions in Sundarijal and Melamchi Water Supply Projects. Source: The 
two-way matric is adapted from Stacey (2002) 
 Close to certainty Far from certainty 
Far from agreement 3.   Disagreement, certainty 
Location of water diversion site 
 
1. Disagreement, uncertainty 
Relocation of upstream communities 
Close to agreement 2. Agreement, certainty 
Water diversion 
Construction of treatment plants 
Monitoring water quality and safety 
 
4. Agreement, uncertainty 
Levy on water transfer, payment of 
environmental services 
Supply of adequate and safe water 
Effectiveness of water treatment plants 
Water allocation 
 
Second, many policy decisions on the two rural to urban water transfer projects that are close to 
an agreement and certain to happen are highly technical. They include water diversion, bulk water 
distribution, construction of treatment plants, monitoring of water quality and safety, increasing 
block tariff and direct metering. These technical interventions to govern water provisioning 
services are influenced by the high modern development paradigm that involves the transfer of 
modern technology and the construction of large-scale concrete structures (Scott, 1998). Third, 
policy decisions that are far from the agreement, but close to certainty are the location of the water 
diversion sites in Sundarijal and Melamchi water supply projects. Finally, decisions on water 
transfer levy and PES are close to an agreement but uncertain during the time of the study. Other 
policy decisions in this category are the effectiveness of water treatment plants to supply adequate 
and safe drinking water. This finding is consistent with the literature that failure to recognize the 
complexity in the governance and management of water resources in Nepal’s transboundary river 
basins led to the loss of ecosystem services, such as self-purification and groundwater recharge 
(Rademacher, 2011; Velz, 1984). As a result of the high modernist water resource development 
paradigm that oversimplified the complex problems,  the ecosystem health of the two socio-
culturally important rivers, Bagmati and Bishnumati, has been deteriorated to an unacceptable 




4.2 Hierarchical social space 
In centralized planning, each level of government has its areas of authority and responsibility, both 
geographically and substantively (Booher, 2005). This concept of authority also applies to the 
interbasin water transfers in Nepal that involve rural and urban municipalities, the state 
government, and the federal ministries. Substantively, as Scott (1998) puts it, hierarchical 
governance involves deep core beliefs about high modern state-building, such as technology 
transfer, large-scale water transfer and dam building.  This finding is supported by previous 
research from Nepal and elsewhere that deliberative processes of public participation would allow 
alternative voices, discourses, beliefs and knowledge in the policy process (Clement et al., 2017).  
In order to improve the ecosystem services of the Bagmati River Basin, the HPCIDBC principally 
aims to transform traditional hierarchical social spaces of decision making into a more distributed 
governance structures despite the practice of top-down decision making in practice. However, it is 
too early to come to a firm conclusion that these spaces are genuinely argumentative in the context 
of Nepal where social hierarchy often translates into hierarchical governance structures and policy 
processes. This finding is consistent with Hinsch’s (2010) notion of argumentative dialogue in the 
collaborative governance and management of ecosystem services. 
When the Melamchi Water Supply Project reached its most controversial stage during 2009, the 
dominant state actors were willing to collaborate with local and Indigenous communities to 
implement community development programmes. Conversely, local communities were also 
looking for opportunities to access the project funding and build their capacity for natural resource 
management and livelihood improvement. These findings substantiate the literature that 
collaborative governance institutions would bridge traditional hierarchies to implement localized 
actions with local or regional governments, and a local or regional government adopt collaborative 
governance to build capacity or access resources from federal or state agencies (Haapala et al., 
2018; Margerum, 2011; Scott et al., 2017). 
4.3 Interdependence of management problems 
Local and Indigenous communities in the Melamchi Valley felt that they were historically 
neglected from the state. As a response to this policy gap, they had willingly collaborated with 
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activist organizations from other regions, including the Kathmandu-based non-governmental 
organizations. The affinity to collaborate across places, spaces and policy sectors also applies to 
traditional natural resource management agencies, mainly when they cannot solve complex and 
interdependent problems alone (Booher, 2005). Managing multiple ecosystem services in Nepal’s 
transboundary river basins is a challenging process as it involves decision making across various 
policy sectors. In our case, they include the WASH sector, agriculture and natural resources, urban 
farming, urban food forests, urban forests, and conservation of the holy rivers and the UNESCO 
World Heritage Sites and farmland. This finding substantiates the proposition that natural resource 
managers are more likely to collaborative to enhance their social capital and to solve problems that 
span across multiple policy sectors along the rural to the urban continuum (Margerum, 2011; Scott 
et al., 2017).  
4.4 Trust and commitment among stakeholders 
In the Melamchi Water Supply Project, after the project faced resistance, the adversarial 
relationships were transformed into cooperative ones through collaboration with local 
organizations, such as the Melamchi Concern Group, various local committees, and Kathmandu-
based non-governmental organizations.  This finding confirms that social capital serves as glue 
within coalitions, brings together stakeholders with shared belief systems who would otherwise 
work independently of each other, and empowers minority stakeholders to establish collaborative 
relationships with those in power and authority (Hawkins et al., 2010). As articulated in the 
propositions about legitimacy (Table 2, conceptual framework), (Feiock, 2013; Scott et al., 2017), 
the Nepali state agencies worked with affected communities and well-reputed civil society 
organizations, albeit only in the later stages of the project to gain legitimacy of the large-scale 
interbasin water transfer.  
4.5 Miscommunication, controversy, and conflict 
Over time, collaborative governance, and management institutions in Nepal's rural to urban water 
supply transfer projects became relatively more diverse and inclusive of traditionally excluded 
stakeholders. This finding aligns with  Booher’s (2005) suggestion that water resource managers 
are increasingly required to deal with an array of stakeholders with their languages, values, 
perspectives, cognitive styles, and worldviews to transform adversarial relationships into 
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cooperative ones. Concerning the propositions outlined in Table 2, natural resource managers 
prefer collaborative governance in the following two situations (Emerson et al., 2015; Scott et al., 
2017): first, when the costs of managing ecosystem services are higher than the cost of 
implementing collaborative measures; and second, when they worry about the loss of power and 
influence (Emerson et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2017). Formation and funding of various social 
upliftment committees in the aftermath of civil society protests were instrumental to transform 
adversarial relationships between the state and the civil society. The civil society organizations 
and local communities, who were initially seen as contingent to the success of the project, were 
transformed into necessary collaborators in both water transfer projects This finding is consistent 
with the literature on building trust between state and civil society organizations (Friedman et al., 
2002, 2006). In both water transfers in Nepal, the most salient regulatory policy instruments to 
facilitate the governance and management of water resources are the payment for environmental 
services and water transfer levy although their effectiveness is yet to be seen. This finding aligns 
with the literature on the governance and management of ecosystem services in Nepal and 
elsewhere (Adhikari et al., 2013; Bhatta et al., 2014; Engel et al., 2008; Pant et al., 2013). 
5. Conclusion  
Sustainability of water provisioning services in Nepal’s transboundary river basins is at risk 
because the state has responded to looming water demand within the paradigm of high modernist 
state building using the available funding from multilateral aid agencies. The state interventions 
in the governance and management of ecosystem services focused primarily on the development 
of large-scale infrastructures, such as the tunnel and treatment plants without a genuine 
collaboration with the communities affected by water resource development. Hence, the novelty 
of this research lies in a systematic interrogation of the institutional aspects of water provisioning 
services, particularly collaborative governance structures and policy processes, that are not 
sufficiently addressed in the literature on governance and management of ecosystem services. This 
study concludes with the following five recommendations. First, community engagement should 
be initiated from the inception of a project. In the Melamchi Water Supply Project, collaborative 
governance institutions were established as a reactive measure to placate civil society protests 
against the high modernist development interventions that could not sufficiently address social and 
environmental impacts. Second, to facilitate the process of community engagement, the state 
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should move beyond the centralized, predictive planning and implementation of resource 
development projects and engage the affected communities and other stakeholders in project co-
design and implementation. In Nepal’s case, it was a missed opportunity to build regional and local 
capacity to govern and manage multiple ecosystem services. Third, water resource management 
projects should include multiple and interdependent sectors, actors, governance structures and 
policy processes. As the research results show, Nepal’s water resource management challenges are 
interdependent and involve multiple policy sub-sectors: water, sanitation, hygiene, food, 
agriculture, natural resources, urban farming, food forests, urban forests, and conservation of the 
holy rivers and the UNESCO World Heritage Sites and farmland. Fourth, the state should 
proactively seek genuine participation of affected communities, activist groups, and non-
governmental organizations rather than transforming adversarial relationships as a reaction to 
outrageous downstream communications of policy concerns through street protests. It is time to 
transform the established culture of street protests to influence every policy process. Finally, a 
genuine collaboration with affected communities should be aimed at creating argumentative spaces 
where multiple stakeholders can safely engage in alternative propositions for governance and 
management of ecosystem services. These recommendations can be applied to the governance and 
management of multiple ecosystem services across the developing world to make effective policy 
decisions in rural to urban water transfers in transboundary river basins. 
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